Markscheme

May 2015

History route 2

Higher level

Paper 3 – aspects of the history of Africa

27 pages

Paper 3 markbands: The following bands provide a précis of the full markbands for paper 3 published in the History guide (2008) on pages 77–81. They are intended to assist marking, but must be used in conjunction with the full markbands found in the guide. **For the attention of all examiners: if you are uncertain about the content/accuracy of a candidate's work please contact your team leader.**

18–20:	Answers are clearly focused, with a high degree of awareness of the question, and may challenge it successfully. Knowledge is extensive, accurately applied and there may be a high level of conceptual ability. Evaluation of different approaches may be present as may be understanding of historical processes as well as comparison and contrast where relevant. Evaluation is integrated into the answer. The answer is well-structured and well-focused. Synthesis is highly developed.
15–17:	Answers are clearly structured and focused, have full awareness of the demands of the question, and if appropriate may challenge it. Accurate and detailed historical knowledge is used convincingly to support critical commentary. Historical processes such as comparison and contrast, placing events in context and evaluating different interpretations are used appropriately and effectively. Answers are well-structured and balanced and synthesis is well-developed and supported with knowledge and critical commentary.
12–14:	Answers are clearly focused on the demands of the question. Relevant in-depth knowledge is applied as evidence, and analysis or critical commentary is used to indicate some in-depth understanding, but is not consistent throughout. Events are placed in context and there is sound understanding of historical processes and comparison and contrast. Evaluation of different approaches may be used to substantiate arguments presented. Synthesis is present, but not always consistently integrated. Focus on AO3 and AO4.
9–11:	Answers indicate that the question is understood, but not all implications considered. Knowledge is largely accurate. Critical commentary may be present. Events are generally placed in context, and historical processes, such as comparison and contrast, are understood. There is a clear attempt at a structured approach. Focus on AO1, AO2 and AO4. Responses that simply summarize the views of historians cannot reach the top of this markband.
7–8:	The demands of the question are generally understood. Relevant, historical knowledge is present but is unevenly applied. Knowledge is narrative or descriptive in nature. There may be limited argument that requires further substantiation. Critical commentary may be present. There is an attempt to place events in historical context and show an understanding of historical processes. An attempt at a structured approach, either chronological or thematic has been made.
5–6:	Answers indicate some understanding of the question, but historical knowledge is limited in quality and quantity. Understanding of historical processes may be present but underdeveloped. The question is only partially addressed.
3–4:	There is little understanding of the question. Historical knowledge is present but the detail is insufficient. Historical context or processes are barely understood and there are little more than poorly substantiated assertions.
1–2:	Answers do not meet the demands of the question and show little or no evidence of appropriate structure. There is little more than unsupported generalization.
0:	Answers not meeting the requirements of descriptors should be awarded no marks.

Examiners and moderators are reminded of the need to apply the markbands that provide **the "best fit"** to the responses given by candidates and to **award credit wherever it is possible to do so**. If an answer indicates that the demands of the question are understood and addressed but that **not all implications are considered (*eg*, compare or contrast; reasons or significance; methods or success)**, then examiners should not be afraid of using the full range of marks allowed for by the markscheme: *ie*, responses that offer good coverage of some of the criteria should be rewarded accordingly.

Pre-colonial African states (Eastern and Central Africa) 1840–1900

1.   Examine the ways in which Lewanika of the Lozi **and** Mkwawa of the Hehe responded to the difficulties of state-building in pre-colonial Africa.

Candidates will be expected to stress some of the general challenges facing leaders in building and consolidating their kingdoms. These should include the issue of survival in a rapidly changing and hostile environment where different groups raided and plundered their rivals and competed for control over trade routes, as well as the challenges of how to construct viable economies and administrative systems and respond to the incursions of foreigners.

Military factors may include: both Lewanika and Mkwawa used the threat of outside forces as a means of rallying support and consolidating power (in the case of the Lozi this was achieved by appealing to recent memories of defeat and subjugation by the Kololo while Mkwawa used the threat of Ngoni raiders as a means of persuading rival groups in the area to come under his protection); Lewanika reorganized his army by ending the autonomy of the *indunas* and bringing all regiments under his personal control and used his military prowess to defeat the Ila and Tonga peoples to the east, while Mkwawa mimicked the tactics of his Ngoni adversaries in order to win a series of victories over them; vanquished neighbours were forced to pay tribute to Mkwawa and Lewanika.

Economic factors could include Lewanika's expansion of the ivory trade with the Portuguese to the west and his welcoming of European traders to his court, while Lozi agriculture was boosted through the use of slaves captured in war. Contrastingly, the mainstay of the Hehe economy was raiding: Mkwawa organized lucrative attacks on the caravan routes that ran from Lake Tanganyika to the coast. He also expanded agricultural production around his fortified capital by introducing new irrigation techniques, although the frequency of Hehe raiding militated against the emergence of an economy based on trade with neighbouring groups.

Political factors may include: centralization as an important feature in the rise of each state, with Lewanika appointing family members to positions of authority in order to ensure loyalty while Mkwawa ensured that he alone could appoint and dismiss regional governors; the ways in which symbolic trappings of traditional leadership were employed by each in order to enhance personal power – in the case of Lewanika this extended to the resurrection of a cult of divine kingship that provided further legitimacy for his rule; Lewanika's skilful diplomacy, which contrasted with Mkwawa's more ruthless approach of enforcing his rule through terror and coercion. Brief mention might also be made of how each leader confronted the threat of European imperialism. However, a more detailed analysis of how Lewanika met with relative success in dealing with the British while the Hehe succumbed to German colonial expansion lies beyond the scope of the question.

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2.   To what extent was the emergence of the Mahdist state (1881–1898) the result of changes in social and economic organization in Sudan?

Candidates should stress the ways in which changes in economic and social organization were key factors in the rise of the Mahdist state. The core of the Mahdi's support came from the pastoralist Baqqara people of the Darfur and Kordofan regions, who resented the attempts of the Anglo-Egyptian government to circumscribe their nomadic lifestyle and raise revenues through taxation of their livestock. However, he was also backed by the influential merchant class in Khartoum, which objected to a colonial administration that sought to exercise a monopoly over trade in the region. The religious fervour and piety that accompanied the rise of the Mahdi, who was supported by a dedicated and highly-motivated band of followers, was another obvious factor resulting from social changes. The phenomenon was part of a general upsurge in jihadi sentiment which swept across Africa in the 19th century, at the heart of which was an urge to sweep away the venality and decadence of contemporary society and restore the Muslim faith in its purest form. Another socio-economic factor was the attempt of the Anglo-Egyptian authorities, especially under Gordon, to abolish slavery, an institution which had become a key element of traditional Sudanese economy and society. The partial withdrawal of Anglo-Egyptian authority after 1880 led to a resurgence in the slave trade and a resulting economic recovery that strengthened the position of the Mahdist forces. Support for the Mahdi also grew as a result of the forced conscription into the Egyptian army of ordinary Sudanese, together with the suppression of indigenous cultural practices by the British.

Candidates may also note that there were political factors as well as changes in social and economic organization. Foremost among these was the singular political character of the Mahdi, who used his personal charisma to build a formidable base of popular support. He was also a wily general and astute political schemer. His armies benefited as a result of the British underestimation of their foe: the Mahdi and his followers were routinely dismissed as crazed and undisciplined fanatics. On a general political level, the very fact their independence had been lost to the Turco-Egyptian (and later on Anglo-Egyptian) occupation was a key element in generating anger among the Sudanese. This eventually translated into support for the Mahdi, who was able to channel political disaffection into armed resistance. Finally, the decision of the British to remove Gordon from his post as governor in 1880 and cut back on its expenditure in the Sudan was also crucial. This resulted in a partial power vacuum that the Mahdi was able to exploit to the full.

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Pre-colonial African states (Southern and West Africa) 1800–1900

3.   Evaluate the principal factors that led to the Mfecane.

Candidates are required to make an appraisal of the leading factors that led to the Mfecane, weighing up their individual and collective strengths and weaknesses. The subject guide specifies political, economic and social causes of the Mfecane, and these categories may form the basis of responses.

Political factors could include the plethora of small competing Nguni kingdoms that emerged in the region in the early 19th century. There should be some mention of how series of wars that constituted the start of the Mfecane began when Chief Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa allied with the Tsonga and blocked access to the Portuguese trading post of Delagoa Bay to his rival, Zwide of the Ndwandwe. In the ensuing battle Dingiswayo was defeated and killed, and the remnants of his armies joined with a small but emerging force in the region: the Zulus under Shaka. Shaka in turn defeated Zwide and absorbed the Ndwandwe, and began a dual process where he extended his own kingdom while initiating a chain reaction of violence as rivals fled from the carnage and in turn attacked other groups where they settled. This account hinges on political and social explanations and emphasizes the militaristic and expansionist nature of Nguni polities, and in particular the influence of Shaka. Shaka's military innovations were crucial to the process, as these were mimicked by his victims who then used them against other groups. These included the use of the *iklwa*, a short stabbing spear used to devastating effect in close combat, the adoption of the "ox-head" battle formation, and the organization of troops into the *impi* age grade regiments. The practice of sparing only the women and young men of vanquished foes and absorbing them into the Zulu population was also widely copied by displaced groups as the effects rippled right across the region.

More recent studies of the Mfecane have stressed the importance of economic changes in the region, and the focus is on environmental and external factors that profoundly destabilized Nguni society. A rise in agricultural output due to introduction of corn in the late 18th century led to population increases and a rise in the number of young men of fighting age, while prolonged droughts in the first two decades of the century heaped added pressure on the burgeoning kingdoms and intensified competition for resources. The presence of Portuguese traders in Delagoa Bay was equally important, as different groups competed for control over the lucrative trading routes. Slave raids, both from Delagoa Bay in the north and for the Cape labour market in the south, were an increasingly common and disruptive feature of the period. The result was an explosion of warfare as these pressures could no longer be contained within the existing political structures of the Nguni.

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4. "Religion was the main reason for the rise and success of the Sokoto caliphate under Usman Dan Fodio." To what extent do you agree with this statement?

Dan Fodio was a member of the Qadiriyya brotherhood and a proponent of a reformist, Sufi-influenced strain of the Islamic faith. Theology was central to his upbringing and infused his many ideas on philosophy, jurisprudence and education. His insistence on the strict application of sharia law was a key element in his wider appeal. He built up a strong base of support among ordinary Fulani herders and his followers regarded him as a Mahdi or "divinely guided one", although Dan Fodio himself was quick to disavow the title. He rallied his armies under the banner of jihad against the unpopular Hausa emirs who dominated the region and began a series of conflicts that culminated with the fall of Gobir in 1808. The purity of Dan Fodio's vision resonated among a people who had become disillusioned with what they felt was a corrupt and sybaritic ruling elite. The notion of an *ummah* or a single Islamic community was a crucial element in holding his loose federation together, and while Dan Fodio retired to a life of teaching and writing after the triumph of his jihad, Islamic law and schooling were key features of the caliphate that he was responsible for creating. The administrative structures of the state were deliberately designed to echo those put in place by the Prophet Mohammed in Medina, a factor that further reinforced the legitimacy of the caliphate among its subjects. Finally, the bureaucracy of the caliphate was largely made up of pious and dedicated religious scholars.

In order to debate the statement, some responses may stress that while religious factors were crucially important to the rise of the caliphate, there were other political and economic reasons for Dan Fodio's success. Hausa rule was regarded as oppressive and this explains his popularity among ordinary Fulani. However, hatred of the authorities was not just confined to Dan Fodio's kinsmen: excessive taxation of cattle herds alienated many Hausa peasants too, and the result was that they took part in his jihad. Incessant warfare between the Hausa states had the dual effect of weakening their armies and forcing the emirs to increase taxes on townspeople as well as peasants. This led to a further decline in the popularity of the ruling aristocracies. Once established, the caliphate prospered through economic policies based on the establishment of new urban centres and the promotion of plantation agriculture. Trade was extended across the region. The autonomy enjoyed by individual rulers across much of the caliphate was another reason for the durability of the state.

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European imperialism and annexation of Africa 1850–1900

5.   Evaluate the importance of political factors in stimulating European colonial expansion in Africa before 1884.

Political factors may refer to popular nationalism in individual countries in Europe, to national rivalry between the European powers that spilled over into competition for colonies, to the strategic calculations of these powers, and even to political weaknesses in African societies that facilitated the partition. In an age of growing popular nationalism the exploits of early explorers were followed avidly by the general public through mass circulation newspapers, as were colonial wars in the latter part of the period. Although it has been asserted that the extent of this factor has been exaggerated, the argument runs that popular enthusiasm for colonies put pressure on governments, who naturally viewed imperial expansion as a potentially vote-winning policy. Competition for colonies was often the result of a direct rivalry with a traditional foe, as was the case with Anglo-French competition in Egypt and in West Africa. French desires to redeem national pride following defeat at the hands of Germany in 1871 played a significant role in stimulating their colonizing efforts in West Africa in particular. Bismarck's sudden and unexpected decision to enter the scramble at the end of the period may well have been motivated by his recognition of the political capital and electoral and diplomatic mileage that might be accrued as a result of taking colonies. More minor powers such as Belgium and Portugal saw colonial involvement as a means of asserting their status on a global stage. In particular, the role of King Leopold in the Congo region may be stressed by candidates.

The strategic argument locates much of the early activity of the scramble in Egypt and South Africa. These two countries were regarded as crucial to the British because of their strategic location on the sea routes to the "jewel in the crown" of their empire, India. Egypt was considered particularly important after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the nationalist revolt of Urabi Pasha threatened the stability of the country, resulting in military intervention in 1882. French anger at the British occupation led to the breakdown of the so-called "gentleman's agreement" in West Africa, resulting in the acceleration of the scramble there. In South Africa, Britain attempted to federate South Africa in 1877 by annexing the Transvaal in order to ensure that imperial rivals like Germany and Portugal were kept out of the region. This consideration also led to them declaring protectorates over a number of African kingdoms. It can also be argued that there were strong strategic motivations for Germany's involvement in the scramble. Bismarck had long sought to encourage the imperial designs of other powers in Africa (especially the French) in order to keep them divided and distracted from European affairs. His sudden and unexpected entry into to the scramble in 1884 has been explained as a desire to acquire colonies in order to use them as diplomatic "bargaining chips". Candidates might point to some of the weaknesses of the strategic argument, such as the absence of strategic consideration in one area of the continent where much of the early activity of the scramble took place (West Africa) and argue that economic factors were equally, if not more, important. They might also highlight the role of the so-called "man on the spot" whose initiatives in extending imperial control often ran counter to the wishes of governments. However, the main focus should be political factors.

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6.   Examine the role of German annexation in accelerating the "scramble for Africa".

Candidates may well argue that Bismarck's sudden decision to annex colonies for Germany in 1884 was a turning point in the history of the scramble for Africa. His move seemed to represent a dramatic *volte-face* on what had been his colonial policy up until that point. This had been to stay out of the grab for colonies himself but to encourage the imperial designs of other powers (especially the French) in order to distract them from European affairs, and by doing so draw them into rivalry and competition that would preclude the formation of an anti-German alliance. However, the declaration of German protectorates in East Africa, South West Africa, the Cameroons and Togoland signalled Germany's arrival as a major colonial player and spurred the existing powers into responding to Bismarck's gambit. Candidates may argue that they did so in the following ways: the British revived plans to federate South Africa in order to prevent the Boer republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State from falling under German influence by ending their independence, a process that culminated in the South African War; the British and French firmed up their positions in West Africa in response to the arrival of Germany in the region – the French by finally breaking Mandinka resistance and Britain by bringing Asante autonomy to an end; the British decided to grant Mackinnon's Imperial East Africa Company an imperial charter and charge it with the task of bringing the *kabaka's* kingdom under the protection of the crown, partly due to the prospect of a German incursion into Buganda from Tanganyika and the accompanying fear that the headwaters of the Nile might fall into hostile hands; and British sub-imperialists such as Cecil Rhodes moved ahead with their dreams of creating a colonial corridor from Cape to Cairo partly out of fear that the Germans would try to link their colonies from east to west, in the process stymying British designs in the southern African interior. The relative weakness of the Portuguese positions in Angola and Mozambique only served to heighten Britain's sense of anxiety. This explains the British urgency in declaring a protectorate over Bechuanaland and in destroying Lobengula's Ndebele state.

Candidates may also argue that German ambitions in Africa were linked to Bismarck's decision in late 1884 to call the Berlin West Africa Conference. The conference established the principle of "effective occupation" and this undermined the historical claims of older powers like Portugal to the hinterlands of their coastal colonies. This opened the field to newer, more dynamic powers like Germany to make good their claims across the continent. Indeed, explorers such as Karl Peters in East Africa were already busy seeking treaties of protection with African rulers, and this in turn generated a "second scramble" as agents of rival imperial powers clamoured for treaties of their own before Germany could beat them to it. Candidates may argue that the impact of German annexation was limited in that the scramble was already well underway (and indeed accelerating) prior to its arrival on the scene, with Anglo-French rivalry leading to colonization in West Africa and the British decision to occupy Egypt in 1882. Indeed, it could be argued that Bismarck's motives in convening the Berlin conference were less about furthering Germany's claims in Africa and more about ensuring that imperial rivalries did not spill over into a European war in which Germany might itself become embroiled.

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Response to European imperialism (Eastern and Central Africa) 1880–1915

7.   Evaluate the reasons for the success of Menelik II and the failure of the Nandi against European imperialism**.**

Candidates are required to make an appraisal of the reasons for the success of Menelik's resistance and the failure of that of the Nandi. They should be aware of the dramatically contrasting circumstances facing Menelik on the one hand and the Nandi on the other. The Ethiopian emperor was aware of the threat that Italy posed to his country from the moment that he acceded to the imperial throne in 1889, yet he always operated from a position of relative strength. He signed the Treaty of Wuchale, which conceded the province of Eritrea to the Italians in return for the formal recognition by Rome of the Ethiopian state. However, a dispute over differing versions of the translation of the treaty led to its abrogation by Menelik and a steady worsening of relations between the two sides. This breakdown culminated in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1896, but the clash of the two armies at Adowa resulted in a crushing Italian defeat and the consolidation of Ethiopian independence. While much weaker, the Nandi, led by the redoubtable Koitalel arap Samoei, offered stern resistance to the British East Africa Company from their base in the central Kenyan highlands from the early 1890s, and by doing so managed to preserve their independence for well over a decade. They were the last of the peoples of British East Africa to succumb to British imperialism, but only after their leader was murdered by the British and his Nandi forces were finally vanquished in battle in 1905.

Candidates may well challenge the question by stressing that Nandi relations with the British had been characterized by successful resistance for more than a decade. Some of the reasons for this, such as the presence of a formidable and indefatigable leader in the shape of Koitalel and the suitability of Nandi country terrain to a sustained campaign of guerrilla warfare, may be mentioned in the answer but the focus of the question is on the reasons for the eventual defeat of the Nandi. One answer lies in the strength of their opponent. By 1905 the British had already pacified the remainder of British East Africa and were therefore able to muster a sizeable and well-armed force in the field against the Nandi. By contrast, the maximum strength of the Nandi army was barely 6000 men. The Nandi were thus isolated and alone in the face of a superior military force, unlike Menelik who could rely on the support of the provincial *rases* who rallied around him in response to the Italian invasion. The result was an Ethiopian army of up to 100 000 men at Adowa, a force that outnumbered the Italian army by five to one. The Ethiopian troops also enjoyed superior firepower at Adowa, with their leaders having spent the previous decade buying guns from the British, French, and indeed the Italians. The relative isolation of Nandi country, which Koitalel had used to his strategic advantage, also meant that the Nandi had more difficulty in procuring the sort of weaponry that Menelik found easier to find. The failure of Italian attempts to woo Menelik's regional rivals to their cause was a major reason for their defeat. Indeed, the abandonment of the Italians by two of their key Tigrean allies, who defected to Menelik with reports of Italian commander Baratieri's battlefield positions, had a decisive impact on the outcome of Adowa. This stands in stark contrast to the situation of the Nandi in 1905, when their resistance was broken only after Koitalel was treacherously murdered at a meeting arranged by his British adversaries.

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8. To what extent was Lobengula personally responsible for the loss of Ndebele independence to the British?

Candidates may well focus on increasing European interest in Lobengula's territory after the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand and the eventual invasion and defeat of the Ndebele in 1893. Events mentioned may include the following: Lobengula's grant of land for mineral exploration to Sir John Swinburne in 1870, known as the Tati Concession, which was followed by cordial relations between the Ndebele and Europeans; Lobengula's extension of a guarantee of protection to Europeans living on his territory; negotiations with the Charles Rudd-led expedition (sent by Cecil Rhodes in 1888 to extract further concessions) which were to drag on for several months; Leander Starr Jameson's negotiation of the Rudd Concession, which supposedly offered the king money and weaponry and a British pledge that any whites would be considered as "guests" in Lobengula's territory, but which in reality amounted to an award of exclusive mining rights to the British; the British decision to use the concession to charter the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1889, despite Lobengula's petition to Queen Victoria to have the charter cancelled; and Rhodes's use of the BSAC as an instrument to press home his advantage by invading and colonizing Lobengula's territory. Candidates may argue that Lobengula's apparent naivety was a prime reason for the loss of Ndebele independence, in that he failed to understand that the British interest in his land was not just commercial. His trust in Jameson and failure to understand the full political implications of the Rudd Concession meant that he was duped of his kingdom. He followed the counsel of missionaries at his court such as John Moffat, who advised him to negotiate exclusively with the British to the exclusion of rival powers such as the Germans, which meant that Lobengula was denied the opportunity to play one would-be colonizer off against another. His defeat and subjugation of the Shona meant that there was little resistance to the BSAC's initial incursion into Mashonaland, and allegations of his brutal treatment of the Shona was used by the company as an excuse for their attack on Bulawayo. In Lobengula's defense, candidates might point out that he was by no means the only African leader to be overwhelmed by the sudden colonizing onslaught. He had no good reason to suspect the duplicity of the British and his armies were finally defeated by superior colonial firepower – as they would have been eventually, the Rudd Concession notwithstanding. Lobengula had indeed proved quite adept in consolidating and extending Ndebele power in the region prior to 1886. The keen interest that the British displayed in his land from that point on was to change everything.

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Response to European imperialism (Southern and West Africa) 1870–1920

9. Examine the reasons for Cetshwayo's resistance to the British, and its impact on the Zulu.

Candidates may note the following reasons for Cetshwayo's decision to resist: simmering Anglo–Zulu tensions following the British decision to establish a colony to the south of Zululand in Natal in 1854, an animosity that was largely due to British disquiet at the presence of such a strong African state on its frontier; the series of wars between the Zulu and the Boers along the Zululand–Transvaal border, which led to Cetshwayo's request of an alliance with the British, an offer that was promptly declined; the British invasion of the Transvaal in 1878 in an attempt to forcibly federate the white provinces of South Africa, the temporary success of which led to Britain turning its attention to Cetshwayo's kingdom; British High Commissioner Sir Bartle Frere's ultimatum to the king, which was accepted in its entirety with the exception of a single point relating to the disbanding of the Zulu army; and the subsequent British invasion of Zululand in 1879 which culminated in the humiliating military reversal at Isandhlwana. Despite the victory of his army, Cetshwayo realized that he had provoked a great imperial power and ordered his forces to retreat and wage a guerrilla campaign against the British. His *indunas* refused to comply and the result was the destruction of the Zulu armies at the Battle of Ulundi in 1881. Candidates may thus conclude with some justification that Cetshwayo chose to resist the British because he was left with little option. Astutely recognizing that Britain represented a formidable threat to his Zulu kingdom, his initial preference was for collaboration. However, his overtures for an alliance were spurned by the British. When Frere presented an ultimatum he did his utmost to comply, short of surrendering his kingdom. In the end, Cetshwayo's land was invaded by the British army and he had no choice but to resist. The immediate results of Ulundi were the destruction of the Zulu nation and its break-up by the British into thirteen smaller kingdoms, as well as Cetshwayo's deposition and exile. These smaller states were constantly at war and proved difficult for the British to control, who invited Cetshwayo to return and restore order in 1883. However, his authority was well and truly broken, and in an ensuing civil war he was forced to flee. He died shortly afterwards. Any remaining semblance of Zulu independence was finally broken with the disastrous Bambatha rebellion of 1906. Nonetheless, Cetshwayo's legacy has endured: although Zulu power was now at an end its people still felt a strong sense of Zulu identity, and this was to have important repercussions for subsequent South African history.

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10. "French military strength was the main factor in the defeat of the Mandinka Empire." To what extent do you agree with this statement?

Candidates may challenge the basic assumption of the statement, which is that that the defeat of the Mandinka was a simple matter of European military superiority over a weaker African adversary. Samori Toure's Mandinka state had a modern, well-equipped army, and the French considered him to be a formidable foe. He was only defeated in 1898 after more than a decade and a half of warfare against France, much of it successful. Candidates may point to some of the following factors that were key to Samori's success and which amount to a challenge to the statement: he used his trading skills and the economic success of his empire in order to build up a huge arsenal of modern rifles, mainly bought from the British through Sierra Leone; he had a disciplined and highly professional standing army of up to 35 000 men and an elite cavalry regiment of 3000; he used his troops to keep colonial armies at bay as the French attempted to expand their African empire from their base in Senegal to the west. The French began a series of wars in 1882 but the Mandinka managed to inflict a number of defeats on their opponents. Samori's eventual response to superior French firepower was to prosecute a successful guerrilla campaign that included the use of scorched earth tactics. The French were eventually obliged to recognize Samori's obduracy when they signed a treaty with the Mandinka in 1889. Conflict resumed a couple of years later when a larger French army invaded, occupied the Mandinka capital and forced Samori into an eastwards retreat. This pattern of incursion and retreat was to be repeated until he finally surrendered in 1898. During this final phase of the struggle French military superiority was indeed to prove decisive.

Moreover, candidates may be aware of factors other than superior French firepower that explain Samori's defeat. He found himself bereft of allies at the crucial moment when the French were preparing for a final military assault on his empire. Negotiations for an alliance with King Prempeh were dashed when the British occupied Asante in 1896. Similarly, his hopes of forestalling the French advance by persuading the British to declare a protectorate over his lands were foiled because of the preoccupation of the latter with the Gold Coast interior, together with their tacit acknowledgement that the upper Niger region came under France's West African sphere of influence. The French strategy immediately following their treaty of 1889 was to instigate rebellion against Samori among the different peoples of his state and to supply rebel groups with arms, using the conquered Tukolor Empire to the north as the base for these activities. Following repeated and debilitating French invasions, Samori took the decision to abandon his former empire in order to found a new one in the northern part of modern Cote d'Ivoire. However, he now found himself in the unlikely situation of ruling over a resentful and rebellious subject population. Following another French attack Samori once again adopted scorched earth tactics. This strategy, which had served him so well in the past, now proved his undoing. He found it impossible to replenish his weaponry at the precise moment when he needed it most because supply lines to the coast had been severed due to the devastation. The Mandinka were finally forced to surrender.

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Developments in South Africa 1880–1994

11. Examine the significance of economic factors as a cause of the South African War (1899–1902).

Candidates are expected to recognize that factors other than economic ones were important causes of the South African War. However, the question specifies economic causes, and these should be the main focus of the answer. In any case, it is possible to link the various types of causes. For instance, the discovery of diamonds at Kimberly in 1867 fundamentally altered relations between the Crown and the Orange River Colony, resulting in Britain's annexation of Griqualand West in 1877. In the same year a British expedition formally annexed the South African Republic as the first stage of a scheme to forcibly federate the four white-ruled territories under British rule. Following a brief conflict the Boers emerged victorious at Majuba in 1881, and a British determination to "avenge" this defeat influenced the deteriorating relations between the two for the remainder of the century. No doubt strategic factors played a major role in British planning, but it would be foolish to imagine that the economic potential of unifying a mineral-rich territory had no impact on its calculations. Nonetheless, it was the discovery of large gold deposits on the Witwatersrand that revolutionized the economy of the entire region. The city of Johannesburg soon eclipsed Cape Town as the most populous in South Africa as a huge influx of workers poured to the mines in search of labour. Many of these were whites of British extraction. The so-called *uitlanders* opposed Paul Kruger's government in Pretoria which they regarded as backward and incapable of running a modern economy. *Uitlander* political parties were soon formed, supported by wealthy mine owners like Alfred Beit and Barney Barnato. These parties asserted the political rights of the Anglophone population and demanded the full extension of the franchise to all whites in the Transvaal. In turn, rural Afrikaners resented the lifestyle of the English city-dwellers and felt threatened by the political demands of the *uitlander* parties. The Kruger government was determined to resist the franchise demands as English-speakers in the republic now outnumbered the Boer population. Yet economic factors remained of key importance: British disquiet over Kruger's railway line to Lourenco Marques and the Drifts Crisis of 1895 – a dispute over the duties on goods coming into the Transvaal from the Cape – led directly to the Jameson Raid, an abortive attempt by the Cape government to spark an *uitlander* rising on the Rand. The Drifts Crisis has also been linked to the appointment of Alfred Milner as British High Commissioner to South Africa in early 1897, a crucial step on the road to war. Milner described himself as a "British race imperialist" and was dismissive of the independence of the Boer Republics. He used the franchise issue as a means of ratcheting up tensions between the two sides, leading finally to the outbreak of war in 1899.

No doubt the discovery of gold, and issues surrounding the control of its supply, will be central to the analysis of many candidates, and the importance of the commodity to the liquidity of the global economy will be stressed. Some answers may focus on the wider economy of South Africa at the time, and on British fears that its control of trade and transportation (and its ability to build a coordinated regional economy) might be threatened by the independence of the Boer republics.

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12. Evaluate the impact of the apartheid policies of Malan **and** Verwoerd up to 1966.

Candidates should show awareness that the series of apartheid laws passed by the government of D.F. Malan and his successors after the National Party election victory of 1948 constituted the heart of a comprehensive system of racial segregation, and that the impact on the country in general, and on the non-white population of South Africa in particular, was profound and far-reaching. Reference could be made to the following aspects of apartheid legislation: the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 that made marriage between races illegal, and which was extended to cover all sexual relations in the Immorality Act of 1950; so-called "petty apartheid" laws, including the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, which meant the majority of the population was forced to endure crippling daily indignities; the 1950 Population Registration Act, which formally classified South Africans by race; the Group Areas Act of 1950 and the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, which together made residential separation compulsory and resulted in the forced removal of residents of the so-called "black spots" (enclaves of black population in areas otherwise dominated by the whites) as well as severe overpopulation in the already crowded black townships and a growing squatter problem; the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which established a separate system for blacks and ensured that they would receive a second-class education which prepared them for unskilled and menial roles in the wider economy; and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, which provided for the "independence" of the black homelands and resulted in a dramatic acceleration in the forced resettlement of Africans from urban areas to these economically marginal rural reserves.

Candidates may include as an impact the growth of black opposition to the regime. The passage of discriminatory legislation after 1948 energized and radicalized the ANC, and a mass-action Defiance Campaign was launched in 1952. The government used the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 to crack down on opposition and arrest ANC leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, one result of which was the adoption of a policy of armed struggle against the regime. Other opposition movements included Robert Sobukwe's Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Another effect of apartheid was that the more obviously oppressive and unjust aspects of the system began to invite the opprobrium of the international community, particularly after the Sharpeville massacre of 1960.

It would be appropriate for candidates to mention other apartheid leaders such as Strijdom. However, the subject guide specifies Malan and Verwoerd and the main focus of the response should be these prime ministers. Candidates may also argue that the apartheid system built on legislation that had already been enshrined by the segregationist governments of Smuts and Hertzog. Discussion of the impact of apartheid policies following the death of Verwoerd in 1966 would be inappropriate.

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Africa under colonialism 1890–1980

13.   "Gold Coast (Ghana) won independence in 1957 because of its advanced economic, social and political development." To what extent do you agree with this statement?

The question invites candidates to discuss the extent of Gold Coast's economic, social and political development. Some candidates will argue that in many respects the colony was the most developed on the continent, and that this was a major factor in it winning its independence – before any other sub-Saharan African country – in 1957.

Economic developments before 1957 might include: the promotion of the gold mining sector by the colonial authorities, especially with the establishment of the private Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC); official encouragement of cash crop cultivation, especially cocoa, which provided the basis for a modern, export-oriented economy and a relatively well-off landowning peasantry; and the provision of a basic transport infrastructure. Candidates might argue that these developments did not always work to the benefit of ordinary Africans: the expatriate-owned AGC paid its workers low wages while cash crops were favoured at the expense of subsistence farming. On the whole, however, the Gold Coast had a more advanced economy than those of other countries in the region at the time of independence.

For social development: the provision of a comprehensive system of schooling based on British institutional models (including Legon University), which ensured that the colony had some the most educated people on the continent at independence; the absence of major ethnic rivalries or antagonisms in the colony, despite the large Asante population; and the development of an urban middle class and wealthy rural peasantry – factors that are of course related to economic development.

Political developments will probably be stressed more than the other factors by candidates, and should include: the creation of an administrative system that was largely modernizing and centralizing despite the adoption of a model of indirect rule; the decision to include African representatives in the Legislative Council; the attempts in the 1920s of Governor Guggisberg to foster a moderate nationalist elite through the employment of Africans in technical civil service positions; the 1946 Burns Constitution that provided for a Legislative Council with a majority of elected Africans; the rioting in Accra and other cities in 1948 that marked a radicalization of African politics as Kwame Nkrumah broke away from the moderate United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) to form the Convention People's Party; Nkrumah's Positive Action campaign that was followed by a CPP victory in Legislative Council elections, his release from jail and appointment as "leader of government business" and then prime minister; and the granting of full independence to Ghana in 1957.

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14. Compare and contrast the British colonial administration of Kenya with that of the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique.

Candidates may refer to some of the more obvious contrasts between the colonial rule of the British in Kenya and that of the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, most notably the strength of British authority (early African resistance came to an end in Kenya with the defeat of the Nandi in 1905, while settler ascendency was asserted from as early 1903) compared with the weakness of Portuguese rule in their two colonies (where their control was stutteringly extended only with the help of *prazo* estate owners and chartered companies, and where sporadic revolts continued well into the 20th century).

Nonetheless, there are important comparisons to be made, and these may include the following: all three territories were developed as colonies of white settlement where settler interests typically came first (at least economically); Britain and Portugal both followed a policy of expropriating African land for use by Europeans, with the result that Africans were dislocated, impoverished and in the fullness of time politicized and radicalized; Africans were used as cheap labour reservoir for use in domestic service and for work on settler farms and plantations; Africans were typically banned from cultivating certain cash crops thereby guaranteeing a settler monopoly over production; education for Africans was neglected in all three colonies (some schooling was provided by the government in Kenya, but it was mainly vocational); and Britain and Portugal were equally willing to resort to force and brutality in order to quash the rising nationalist challenge. While the tenor of colonial rule was on the whole racist in all three colonies, it may be argued that the British were more progressive when it came to political inclusion – Africans were represented in the Legislative Council in Nairobi from 1944, for instance, whereas equivalent developments only took place in Portugal's colonies after the outbreak of the independence wars and were therefore entirely reactive. Indeed, the Portuguese fought their counter-insurgency wars almost to the bitter end and only agreed to end their rule after a military coup in Lisbon toppled Caetano in 1974. The British began to seriously consider independence for Kenya after the crushing of the Mau Mau rebellion. Other contrasts might include the following: the Portuguese made use of forced labour, particularly on the *prazo* estates, unlike the British; many Portuguese immigrants were from poor working class backgrounds and thus found themselves in direct competition with their African counterparts, requiring more direct intervention by the government to protect their interests, unlike Kenyan settlers who tended to be minor aristocracy; settler groups had a stronger voice in determining policy in Luanda and Lourenço Marques than in Nairobi, especially after the emergency, when decisions were made to begin the transfer of power to African politicians; Africans in Angola and Mozambique could in theory attain *assimilado* status, which gave them the same political rights as Europeans, unlike their counterparts in Kenya.

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Social and economic developments in the 19th and 20th centuries 1800–1960

15. With reference to **one** region of Africa, evaluate the factors that led to the decline of the slave trade and its replacement with legitimate commerce in the 19th century.

Candidates should include some reference to Britain's abolition of the Atlantic slave trade in 1807, a landmark moment in the transition from slave trade to legitimate commerce in the 19th century. This came after a lengthy campaign of protest and agitation in Britain both inside and outside of parliament, led by figures such as William Wilberforce and Thomas Clarkson. While moral suasion was no doubt central to this campaign, the link with legitimate trade was also obvious: Clarkson kept a chest full of goods such as dyed cloths and wooden objects which he used to demonstrate the potential of trade with the West African littoral as he travelled around the country building up support for the abolitionist movement. This emphasis reflected the fundamental changes in the British and global economies, where "king sugar" was no longer integral to British Empire trade and prosperity in an era of industrial change. Guaranteeing a cheap and steady supply of slaves for the cane plantations of the West Indies was no longer considered a priority for parliament, which now focused more on procuring the raw materials needed for domestic industry – which West Africa in particular offered in abundance: supplies of palm oil (for machine lubricants), groundnuts, gold and timber, among other commodities. From an African perspective, the trade in palm oil appeared to some to be more lucrative and less troublesome than that in slaves, as new African entrepreneurs like Nana and Jaja in the Niger Delta found to their advantage. More stable African societies, as opposed to those ravaged by slaving raids, also offered a far more promising market for the finished products of European industry.

Candidates may note that abolition did not put an end to the slave trade in West Africa, which persisted for several decades afterwards. The coastline proved difficult to patrol and colonial rivals such as France and Portugal had not yet abolished their own trades. Demand continued to be high in Brazil and in the cotton plantations of the American south in particular, and the East African trade surged in response to the decline in supply from the other side of the continent. Internal West African trade also saw a revival as demand was driven by the expanding Sokoto Caliphate in northern Nigeria, as slave numbers reached a 19th century peak in the 1830s. A number of factors then coincided in order to further diminish the slave trade in some parts of the continent by the late 19th century, including: the 1838 abolition of the institution of slavery across the British Empire; abolition in the French Empire (1848); an 1845 treaty between Britain, Portugal and Brazil that allowed the British to search Brazilian-owned vessels in West African coastal waters; victory in the American Civil War for the abolitionist north; the Berlin West Africa Conference, which committed all of the colonial powers to the eradication of slavery in their colonies; the closing of the East African markets that followed the imposition of colonial rule; and the influence of mission churches, which worked to actively discourage the trade and stigmatize the institution among Africans. Nonetheless, candidates would be right to stress the degree to which slavery lingered as an institution in Africa until well into the 20th century.

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16. With reference to **one** region, examine the factors that helped, **and** the factors that hindered, the spread of Christianity in colonial Africa.

Candidates may note the remarkable spread of Christianity in Africa in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The negligible Christian presence on the continent prior to partition stands in stark contrast to the figure of 40 per cent of Africans who considered themselves Christian a few decades later. The most obvious factor driving this dramatic expansion was colonial conquest. Authorities promoted missionary activity because they believed that Christian converts would be less likely to oppose colonialism, and colonial administration provided the political stability that was crucial for the early success of the missions. Further factors include: the emergence of a Christian revivalist movement in Europe and North America during the mid-19th century which stressed Christian proselytizing in Africa and provided funding for the missions; rivalry between Protestants and Catholics, which created a sort of parallel scramble in which different missions competed to extend their influence across the continent before the other side got in first; the provision of missionary education, which was regarded as a means of personal advancement within the new colonial order and thus provided Africans with an incentive to join; the provision of a basic health service; the sympathy felt by some missionaries with the plight of ordinary Africans under colonialism; and the rise of Independent Churches in opposition to the established missions, which provided a further fillip to the growth of Christianity on the continent. The growth of this movement was particularly marked where ordinary Africans suffered grievously under the impact of colonialism, such as in Nyasaland, Congo and South Africa. Independent Churches were also popular in Cote d'Ivoire and among the Kikuyu in Kenya, where there was widespread support for their opposition to European missionary discouragement of traditional social practices such as polygamy and female circumcision.

One obvious impediment to the spread of Christianity was the presence of Islam in many parts of the continent, particularly in West Africa. This explains why the French had very limited success in Christianizing French West Africa despite their early stress on *civilisatrice*. The British model of indirect rule meant that Muslim rulers were often used as agents of colonial administration, and little effort was made to challenge the dominance of Islam in northern Nigeria for instance. In East Africa the strong Islamic presence on the Swahili coast and in northern Uganda, as well as in the Horn of Africa, the Sudan and parts of Ethiopia, was a firm inhibiting factor. The fact that Christianity was often seen as compromised due to its association with the colonial power was also significant. Most early missionaries were white, and this contrasted their faith negatively with Islam which seemed more African. The presence of strong centralized African states in a region also tended to hinder the work of missionaries. Christianity spread more slowly to Buganda than elsewhere in southern Uganda, and to Asante more gradually than other parts of the Gold Coast. The *kabakas* of Buganda even used missionaries as political pawns. By contrast, missionary penetration was more straightforward in societies made up of smaller and weaker political units, such as the Igbo. Similarly, the strong opposition of missionaries to the institution of slavery meant that the Christian faith was adopted more readily in those societies that were victims of slavery and resisted among those who were beneficiaries. The success of European missionaries tended to be patchy in those areas where there was fierce opposition to attempts to eradicate traditional beliefs and practices, such as among the Kikuyu in Kenya. Finally, the attitude of the colonial power was another important factor. The British tended to encourage missionary activity because mission schools and hospitals served as sort of "welfare substitute", thus reducing the costs of administration, while in France the anti-clerical stance of some governments in Paris following the separation of church and state meant that missionaries would sometimes fall out of favour with the authorities.

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Nationalist and independence movements (Eastern and Central Africa)

17. Examine the factors that helped, **and** the factors that hindered, the achievement of independence in Uganda in 1962.

There should be some balance between "helped" and "hindered" in candidate responses. "Factors which hindered" independence are probably the more obvious, and might include the following: the religious rivalries that date all the way back to the factionalist chicanery between Catholics, Protestants and Muslims at the *kabaka's* court in the 19th century; ethnic rivalries, most notably between the Baganda and Bunyoro; further division was between Bantu groups on the one hand and Nilotic peoples on the other; the strongly conservative position adopted by the Baganda elite, which was reluctant to accept an independence that would involve surrendering the dominance of the Baganda and the *kabaka*; and political parties that reflected religious and ethnic divisions as well as class distinctions. These included the Kabaka Yeka (KY), a Baganda royalist party supported by wealthier farmers which had no real political programme beyond securing the post-independence position of the *kabaka*, Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC), which was also Protestant but non-Ganda and enjoyed the support of the middle-class trading community, and the Democratic Party (DP), which was an unlikely coalition of Catholics, non-Ganda conservative elites and trade unions. Ironically, it was an alliance between the KY and UPC that facilitated the final push for independence, with an agreement that the *kabaka* would be president with Obote serving as prime minister.

"Factors which helped the achievement of independence" might also include the following: the anti-*kabaka* riots of poorer Baganda in 1949 that convinced the British that major administrative reforms were necessary for the political development of the colony; the appointment of a liberal-minded governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, in 1952; the reorganization of the Legislative Council to include elected representatives from across the colony; concerns about inclusion in a possible East African Federation dominated by Kenyan settlers, which prompted a flurry of political activity among Africans, one result of which was the temporary exiling of the *kabaka*; and a pragmatic acceptance in London of the inevitability of Ugandan independence, which led to the London Conference in 1960 and elections for a National Assembly a year later. A royalist boycott of this poll handed power to an interim DP administration, a development that led the KY to drop its objections to a new federal constitution, the one remaining obstacle to full independence. A tactical alliance between the KY and the UPC then defeated the DP as Uganda became independent in 1962. Candidates might point to more general factors including the following: the establishment of mission schools in the 19th century as well as Makerere University, the first tertiary institution in East Africa, in 1922; a small settler population; a relatively well developed transport infrastructure; and a colonial administration that promoted the cultivation of cash crops by Africans, most notably cotton and then later coffee, which led to the emergence of a prosperous middle class in the colony.

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18. Examine the ways in which the Central African Federation influenced the achievement of independence in Zambia **and** Malawi.

Candidates may argue that the existence and eventual collapse of the Central African Federation (CAF) either accelerated or delayed the achievement of independence in Zambia and Malawi, but the former position is likely to be the more popular of the two. Federation was conceived as a means of extending the domination of the white settler community of Southern Rhodesia over the other two territories, but it lasted only ten years before its eventual dissolution in 1963 amidst anger and opposition from African politicians. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were to become independent Zambia and Malawi just a year later, a fact that clearly reflects the degree to which nationalist movements in each of these colonies had matured during the period of federation. It can be argued that it could only have been possible to create a federation in the first place because nationalist voices in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia had been so easy to ignore or dismiss. Candidates may point to the following factors in Northern Rhodesia: pre-federation politics that were almost entirely dominated by the small white settler community; the existence of a Legislative Council comprising of elected white representatives but not a single African; a strike of African mineworkers in 1935 that was easily suppressed by the authorities; the creation in 1948 of a Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC), which lacked the funding and infrastructure necessary to challenge the government more effectively; and a muted African response to federation in 1953. In Nyasaland: the brutal suppression of the Chilembwe Revolt of 1914 by the government, which was followed by several years of nationalist quiescence; and the formation in 1941 of the Nyasaland African National Congress (Nyasaland ANC), an organization that also suffered from a lack of effective leadership and money and which was equally powerless to prevent federation in 1953. The advent of federation had the effect of energizing and radicalizing nationalist politics in each of the territories, but only after a six year lull during which African leaders seemed unsure about how they should respond to the new dispensation and its challenges. The Nyasaland ANC was only revived after representatives travelled to London in 1958 and persuaded Dr Hastings Banda to return to lead the movement. Arguments over strategy led to a split in the NRANC in the same year and the formation of a Zambian African National Congress (ZANC) led by the more radical Kenneth Kaunda. The ZANC was banned by the authorities and Kaunda jailed. By this time major unrest had broken out in Nyasaland and the CAF leadership responded by declaring a state of emergency. CAF Prime Minister Roy Welensky was by now viewed in London as a reactionary figure, completely out of touch with developments elsewhere as the "winds of change" swept across the continent. Following the recommendations of the Devlin and Monckton Commissions, the MacMillan government now began to harden its stance towards the CAF, urging it to accept greater rights for Africans as well as the secession of Nyasaland and perhaps Northern Rhodesia. At the 1963 Victoria Falls Conference, African leaders demanded full independence and the disbanding of the federation, and this resulted in its dissolution by the end of the year and independence in 1964.

Candidates may argue that the impact of the CAF was limited, and that Malawi and Zambia may have achieved their independence regardless of its creation. Many of Britain's colonies had already won their independence by the mid-1960s, and it could be argued that independence was delayed because the federation had first to unravel before the process leading to full self-government could commence. The 1950s was the decade when independent movements across the continent came of age, and it is likely that the same would have been true in Malawi and Zambia even without the stimulus of federation. It can also be argued that the main reason for the sudden spurt in nationalist organization and support in Zambia was economic distress rather than federation, with a collapse in global copper prices resulting in job losses across the territory.

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Nationalist and independence movements (Southern and West Africa)

19. Discuss the importance of internal **and** external factors in the achievement of independence for Namibia in 1990.

Internal factors were obviously crucial to the development of the liberation war in Namibia, and these may include the following: the foundation of the South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) in 1960, a group that clearly represented the will of the majority of non-white Namibians; the determination of the Pretoria government, after assuming the mandate for governing the territory in 1919, to administer it as a "fifth province" of South Africa by implementing segregationist and apartheid laws to the advantage of the minority white population and the detriment to the majority; abuses suffered under the apartheid system, which stiffened resistance and led to armed struggle in 1966; the determination of SWAPO to continue with its uprising by mobilizing support from almost all sectors of Namibian society, and despite the brutal suppression of the struggle by the apartheid government and the arrest of many of its leaders; the unsuccessful attempts of Pretoria to undermine SWAPO's support by delegating power to "tribal leaders" who lacked the legitimacy of the liberation movement.

At the same time, candidates may recognize that external factors were also significant. These may include: the terms of trusteeship, which were that Namibia should be governed by South Africa in interests of its people and that it should be prepared for self-government; the clear abuse of these terms by Pretoria, which incurred the wrath of the international community, particularly in the 1960s as a spate of newly-independent African countries emerged onto the global stage; the 1966 UN revocation of South Africa's trustee status and the declaration of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that its occupation was illegal; the 1973 UN decision to appoint a Commissioner for Namibia and recognize SWAPO as the "authentic representative of the Namibian people"; independence for Angola in 1975, which allowed SWAPO to acquire cross-border bases under the protection of a friendly MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government in Luanda; South Africa's invasion of southern Angola and its defeat at the hands of Cuban forces at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988, which led to a growing recognition that its wars in the region were ultimately unwinnable; and finally its decision to withdraw from Angola and initiate moves towards Namibian independence, conditional upon a simultaneous Cuban withdrawal from Angola. A UN transitional group (UNTAG) was deployed to organize elections, which were won handsomely by SWAPO as its leader Sam Nujoma became the country's first president in 1990. No doubt the changing international situation, with South Africa no longer being able to count on the unconditional support of Washington as the Cold War came to an end, was another very important factor in facilitating Namibian independence.

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20. Examine the ways in which Nigeria overcame ethnic and regional rivalries in order to achieve independence in 1960.

Candidates should first identify the various cleavages which stood in the way of Nigerian independence. These include: the predominance of different ethnic groups in different parts of the country – Hausa and Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the west and Igbo in the south east; religious differences, with the north largely Muslim and the south mainly Christian; a Lugardian model of indirect rule that was responsible for the separate development of the different regions under colonialism, with power in the north devolved to emirs and other traditional leaders, while a new elite of administrative officials was trained in the south to rule over smaller, more decentralized units; and southern politicians marked by more modern, less collaborationist attitudes and a greater political radicalism than their northern counterparts. These centripetal tendencies were exacerbated by an administrative structure that reflected regional divisions, with the country divided into Northern and Southern Provinces and Lagos Colony, each with its own set of officials who jealously guarded their power and patronage. The run-up to independence was therefore dominated by rivalry and competition, with each group determined not to lose out in the new post-colonial order. Each of the three main nationalist parties had its roots in one of the three regions: Azikiwe's National Convention of Nigerian Citizens in the southeast; Chief Awolowo's Action Group in the west; and the Northern People's Congress in the north, the leading figure of which was Ahmadu Bello. Controversy raged as to how many seats should be awarded to each of the regions in a new national parliament. In the end, a compromise solution was reached: a new federal parliament was constituted but its powers were circumscribed, while the prime ministers of the three regions retained considerable influence within a loose federal structure. The first independent elections in 1960 represented a conservative triumph of the combined forces of east and north over the more radical west, with Azikiwe becoming governor general (later president) and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa becoming prime minister. Some candidates might note that deep-seated rivalries were not so much overcome as merely ignored in 1960, with the compromise constitution papering over the regional and ethnic cracks. A lengthy discussion of the post-independence period and the events leading up to the outbreak of civil war would not be appropriate in this essay, however. Candidates could also note that regional divisions and rivalries may also have been a factor in causing the British to delay independence for Nigeria, which was another obstacle for nationalist politicians to overcome. The point should not be exaggerated, however: Nigeria achieved its independence just three years after Ghana, the first country on the continent to be decolonized. Some candidates may also stress that divisions between north and south were related to developmental (on the whole the north of the country was less developed economically and the result was that its leaders feared domination by the more advanced south) as well as religious and ethnic factors.

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Post-independence politics to 2000

21. With reference to any **two** African countries in the period up to 2000, discuss the claim that political leaders were the major cause of corruption.

Candidate responses will obviously focus on African leaders, whose corrupt governance was a major cause of weakness and instability in African states. Rather than simply describing corruption, however, it would be appropriate for candidates to explore the reasons why African leaders have tended to be corrupt. These reasons might include: an existing culture of exploitation by officials of ordinary citizens, which Africa's leaders inherited from its colonial past; new, post-colonial political dispensations which lacked structures of accountability, a factor which allowed elected or unelected leaders to get away with graft and corruption and encouraged a culture of greed and impunity; the concentration of the national economy in a particular sector, such as oil or minerals, which made official access to sources of wealth a relatively straightforward affair, a factor which is itself a legacy of an extractive colonial economic model that focused mainly on export of minerals and raw materials; the impact of neo-colonialism, whereby western governments, corporations and other NGOs tolerated or even encouraged corrupt leadership because it made it easier to control African economies; and ethnic rivalries, which encouraged leaders to concentrate wealth in the hands of one group at the expense of others, a factor that created the impression that the appropriation of national resources for the exclusive use of one individual or group was a legitimate political pursuit. Apart from the active role of leaders, candidates may refer more explicitly to political weakness and economic under-development as causes of corruption: the lack of a strong central leadership that led to the emergence of regional power bases, which themselves became competing loci for the misappropriation of wealth; the vastly unequal distribution of resources within a country, which fuelled a culture of corruption at all levels of society; low levels of remuneration, particularly in the civil service, which encouraged workers to do whatever they could in order to make ends meet by demanding unofficial payment for official services rendered; and a police force which was often itself corrupt and thus had little incentive in enforcing anti-corruption laws.

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22.   Compare and contrast the impact of civil wars in any **two** African countries up to 2000.

Candidates should be aware that impact of civil wars has varied very greatly across different African countries, and it is likely that contrasts will outweigh comparisons in their responses. Some obvious points of comparison are the terrible impact on civilian populations and the devastating short to medium-term economic effects. The ethnic genocide that took nearly a million lives in Rwanda in 1994, or indeed the violence perpetrated by the Renamo movement against the Mozambican population in the 1980s would be good examples of the former, while many examples could provide evidence of the latter. In many instances it took at least a decade for economies to begin to recover from effects, such as in Nigeria and Mozambique, while in cases such as Liberia, Sierra Leone or Somalia the damage has been even longer term. The political outcome of civil wars, on the other hand, has varied very greatly. National boundaries have mostly remained intact despite the efforts of secessionist groups to break away from the state, such as was the case with the attempts of the Igbo to engineer the secession of the Biafran region in the Nigerian Civil War. The efforts of Moise Tshombe to split the Katanga region from the rest of the Congo also ended in failure. In contrast, one of the results of the civil war in Ethiopia was independence for Eritrea. In some cases reconciliation between the opposing parties has been the result of civil wars, as was the case following the negotiated end to the civil war between Frelimo and Renamo in Mozambique. More often, especially where the civil war was fought along ethnic lines, the consequence has been enduring enmity between the two sides. In some cases civil wars have led to further disputes. This was the situation in Ethiopia, where the joint victors in the war against Mengistu, Meles's Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and Isaias's (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) EPLF, fought a destructive border conflict. Civil wars have occasionally had a happier outcome. This can include the ousting of a tyrant, as was the case in Uganda with the defeat of Idi Amin in 1979, and again in 1984 when his successor Milton Obote was overthrown.

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Africa, international organizations and the international community

23. "The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) failed to achieve their main objectives because member states lacked a common vision and purpose." To what extent to you agree with this statement?

Candidates should obviously focus on defining the objectives of the OAU and its successor organization, the AU. These may include: liberation of the continent from colonial rule; the preservation of peace between member states; the promotion of economic development and integration; and greater political union leading perhaps to a single African government. It can be argued that the OAU was successful in achieving the first of these objectives (although its role as an active agent of decolonization is certainly debatable) and there was also the odd success story such as the resolution of the so-called "Sand War" between Morocco and Algeria in 1964. However, candidates may equally argue that the record of the two organizations has been largely one of failure.

It may be reasoned that the OAU/AU failed to prevent conflict not because of any fundamental disagreement, but because of a shared consensus on the matter of non-intervention in the affairs of other states. There was a common recognition that the borders inherited from the colonial partitioning of the continent were fragile and vulnerable, and that it was therefore in the interests of all to establish the principle that these frontiers were inviolable. Since many of the crises which confronted the OAU (such as the civil war in Nigeria) were about attempts within countries to re-draw these boundaries, the position has tended to be to allow states to deal with conflict without the threat of external intervention.

Candidates can still argue that differing visions of the role of the organizations were responsible for its failures. These can include: the gap between early luminaries such as Nkrumah and Nyerere who were strong advocates of closer political union and others (typically regional rivals such as Nigeria and Kenya) who were less enthusiastic about pan-Africanism; the manner in which former French colonies in West Africa tended to constitute a regional bloc that was more concerned about its own affairs than those of the continent as a whole; the establishment of groups such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which also promoted a more regional focus; and the obvious division between North African countries (many of which pursued a pan-Arab agenda) and their sub-Saharan counterparts. It can also be argued that the failure of the organizations was the result of the following factors, which are unrelated to the disagreement of members: the way in which the OAU/AU, a grouping of some of the world's poorest and newly-independent states, found itself powerless to act in a region increasingly dominated by superpower rivalry as well as the apartheid government in Southern Africa; the willingness of the UN to intervene in African conflicts, which limited the potential for the OAU to become involved – although it could equally be argued that ineffectiveness of the African body was precisely the reason why the UN had to intervene in the first place.

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24. Evaluate the argument that the United Nations chose not to intervene in Rwanda because of its earlier failure in Somalia.

Candidates should acknowledge the strong link between the debacle of United Nations (UN) intervention in Somalia in 1993 and its failure to take effective action to prevent genocide in Rwanda just a few months later. Somalia began to unravel in the late 1980s with two regions, Somaliland and Puntland, seceding. Regional warlords bore down on Mogadishu as the military dictator Siad Barre decided to flee the capital, resulting in general anarchy, civil war and humanitarian catastrophe.

Under growing international pressure the UN agreed to the creation of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), and 500 Pakistani peacekeepers were sent to the country with a limited and largely inadequate mandate to intervene in order to protect civilian life. The mission was beset by difficulties as rival militias – particularly those loyal to the warlord Mohamed Aidid – attacked the peacekeepers and hampered their operations. The US attempted their own armed intervention in an attempt to restore some order but the results were immediately disastrous. A number of American troops as well as Pakistani peacekeepers were killed before the US staged an ignominious withdrawal from the country.

By the time the Rwandan crisis broke in April 1994 it was clear that UNOSOM had been a complete failure in Somalia. The country still divided among warlords as chaos reigned in the capital, and the UN had lost its appetite for African intervention. In Rwanda the *Interahamwe* militias began their genocide of the Tutsi minority along with Hutu sympathizers, and the tiny UN peacekeeping body, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), was wholly inadequate to the task of preventing the bloodbath. Their mandate prevented them from opening fire on perpetrators and they were incapable of offering basic protection to the victims. The Security Council finally authorized the deployment of a further 5000 peacekeepers but none could be sent at such short notice. The genocide only ended in June when the Tutsi rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led a cross-border invasion from Uganda and removed the extremist Hutu government from power. By this time the terrible genocide had run its course and as many as a million lives had been lost. Apart from its experience in Somalia, candidates may also advance the following reasons for UN inaction in Rwanda: American and British reluctance to authorize use of the word "genocide" in the Security Council; British and French caution lest they be accused of neo-colonial interference in the internal affairs of independent African states; the close ties of the French with successive Hutu-led governments; the sheer scale of the genocide, which may have contributed to the paralysis of the international community; the sense that the genocide had its roots in Africa's "tribal traditions"
and that any intervention would prove futile; uncertainty surrounding the role of the UN in the post-Cold War era; the absence of any valuable resources or significant strategic interest in Rwanda.

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