

History route 2 Higher level and standard level Paper 1 – peacemaking, peacekeeping – international relations 1918–36

Thursday 12 May 2011 (afternoon)

1 hour

Instructions to candidates

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.
- The maximum mark for this examination paper is [25 marks].





5 pages

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Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ...; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to the enforcements of the provisions of the treaties, disarmament and the London Naval Conference (1930).

Source A Herbert Hoover, president of the US between 1929 and 1933, in a statement at a press conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, 22 July 1930.

I shall have the gratification [pleasure] of signing the naval treaty this afternoon at 3 o'clock. With the ratification by the other governments the treaty will translate an emotion deep in the hearts of millions of men and women into a practical fact of government and international relations. It will renew again the faith of the world in the moral forces of goodwill and patient negotiation as against the blind forces of suspicion and competitive armament. It will mark a further long step toward lifting the burden of militarism from the backs of mankind and to speed the march forward of world peace. It will lay the foundations upon which further constructive reduction in world arms may be accomplished in the future. We should, by this act of willingness to join with others in limiting armament, have dismissed from the mind of the world any notion that the United States entertains ideas of aggression, imperial power, or exploitation of foreign nations.


Source B Phillips Payson O'Brien, a lecturer in Modern History writing in the academic book *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy 1900–1936* (1998).

With the first London Naval Conference the naval arms race control process reached its apex [peak]. Parity [equality] between America and Britain was agreed to for every type of warship while Japan had accepted a smaller ratio for every category except submarines. The tragedy of the London Conference is that while it marked a considerable success in the arms control process, it was not a lasting achievement. Within six years naval arms control would be at an end. No ships were scrapped and naval construction increased markedly after the conference. It must also be kept in mind that the London Naval Treaty was a temporary agreement. The British were careful to tell the Americans that the London agreements extended only until 1935, after which the Royal Navy "would have to have more cruisers". Also, when the French and the Italians chose not to sign the London agreements the British inserted a clause which would enable them to withdraw.

Source C

John Bernard Partridge, an illustrator, depicts US president Herbert Hoover and British prime minister Ramsay MacDonald (both standing) with Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini and French foreign minister Aristide Briand (both sitting) in the cartoon "Restrained Enthusiasm" from the British satirical magazine *Punch* (1929).

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE



EXAMPLE

Source D

Zara Steiner, a professor of History writing in the academic book *The Lights that Failed: European International History* 1919–1933 (2005).

Neither the Italians nor the French signed the new limitation pact. France and Italy shared a common land border and were colonial rivals in North Africa. Relations, particularly since Mussolini had taken power, were uneasy, if not strained. For the Italians, lagging far behind the French, the navy became more than a status symbol; it would herald [signal] the building of the new empire. The French argued that if parity [equality] was conceded, the Italians could concentrate their fleet in the Mediterranean and achieve local naval superiority as the French fleet was dispersed through the Mediterranean, the English Channel, and North Atlantic.

The London Naval Treaty of 1930, with only three signatures to its key provisions, represented the high point of inter-war naval limitation; it could not be extended and could not be maintained. There were unique political reasons that had made the apparent compromise possible: American reluctance to translate financial power into naval might; the British decision to cut back on naval construction; and the continuing conservatism of the government in Tokyo.

Source E Winston Churchill, a member of the Conservative Party, which was at that time the opposition party in the British Parliament, in a speech to the House of Commons, 2 June 1930.

This conference is the supreme failure of all conferences. We have seen what it does for our naval defence. But what of other countries? France and Italy – their relations have been definitely worsened. There was no particular assertion of naval competition but, by bringing this on to the table, you have compelled both these nations to assert a demand for absolute parity [equality] which will undoubtedly lead to large naval expenditure. There is tension created between America and Japan which did not exist three months ago. And what of Anglo–American friendship? It is important, as I believe it is the foundation of future safety. And after five years of this it will all have to be done over again. Once again the Great Powers will meet around the table, having focused their attention upon these details, and compare their naval power more. This time, in 1935, our navy will be definitely and finally weaker. I cannot think that it is a wise course of policy for us to pursue.



1.	(a)	What, according to Source B, was the significance of the 1930 London Naval Conference?	[3]
	(b)	What is the message conveyed by Source C?	[2]
2.		pare and contrast the views expressed in Sources D and E about the London Naval erence.	[6]
3.		reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and ce B for historians studying the 1930 London Naval Conference.	[6]
4.		g the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the extent to which you agree with the that the London Naval Conference was unsuccessful.	[8]

- 5 -