

HISTORY

Higher and Standard Level

Wednesday 3 November 1999 (afternoon)

Paper 1

1 hour

This examination paper consists of 3 sections, Section A, Section B and Section C.

Section A consists of 4 questions on Prescribed Subject 1.

Section B consists of 4 questions on Prescribed Subject 2.

Section C consists of 4 questions on Prescribed Subject 3.

The maximum mark for each section is 20.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

Do NOT open this examination paper until instructed to do so.

Answer:

EITHER

all questions in Section A.

OR

all questions in Section B.

OR

all questions in Section C.

EXAMINATION MATERIALS

Required:

None

Allowed:

A simple translating dictionary for candidates not working in their own language

Texts in this examination paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses (three points ...); minor changes are not indicated. Candidates should answer the questions in order.

SECTION A

PRESCRIBED SUBJECT 1: The Russian Revolution and the New Soviet State 1917 - 1929

These documents relate to the role of the military in Petrograd in the 1917 February Revolution. The old style Russian calendar dates are used.

DOCUMENT A *An extract from a letter written by Sergeant Fedor Linde describing his part in the mutiny, 27 February 1917, to Boris Sokolov a Social Revolutionary leader.*

... I was lying in the barrack reading, so absorbed that I did not hear shouts and roars coming from the street. A wild bullet broke the window near my couch. ... The Cossacks were firing on defenceless and unarmed crowds, striking people with their whips, crushing the fallen with their horses. And then I saw a young girl trying to escape from the galloping horse of a Cossack officer. She was too slow. A severe blow on the head brought her down under the horse's feet. She screamed. It was her inhuman penetrating scream that caused me to jump to the table and cry out wildly, "Friends, friends! To arms! To arms! They are killing innocent people."

They (the Preobrazhensky Regiment) followed me without realising where or in what cause they went. ... They all joined me in the attack **against the Cossacks and the police.**

DOCUMENT B *An extract from The Russian Century by Brian Moynahan. Published 1994. A photograph of the courtyard of the Technological College, Petrograd with private cars commandeered by revolutionary soldiers, February 1917.*



The commandeered cars and trucks were usually ineffective as most of their drivers could not drive, were often drunk and the occupants of the overcrowded vehicles shot wildly in the air.

DOCUMENT C *An extract from A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes, a British historian, first published in 1996.*

On the 28th [February] the Military Commission [of the Duma] ordered the soldiers who had mutinied to return to their garrisons and to recognise the authority of their officers. But soldiers were afraid that they would be punished ... and turned to the Soviet to protect them. The result was Order Number One.

... The Order was a popular creation in all senses of the term. Sukhanov watched as Sokolov sat at a table: surrounded on all sides by soldiers, standing, sitting and leaning on the table, half dictating and half suggesting to Sokolov what he should write. ... There was no agenda and no discussions of any kind, everyone spoke and all were completely absorbed in the work, formulating their collective opinion without any voting.

... The Order was read out before the Soviet then in session in the Catherine Hall and passed unanimously to the thunderous applause of the soldiers. This crucial document, which did more than anything else to destroy the discipline of the army and thus in a sense brought the Bolsheviks to power had only taken a few minutes to pass.

DOCUMENT D *Soviet Order Number One: Issued 1 March 1917.*

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has decreed: ...

3. In all political actions troop units are subordinate to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
4. The orders of the Military Commission of the State Duma are to be obeyed, with the exception of those instances in which they contradict the orders and decrees of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
5. All types of arms, such as rifles, machine guns, armoured cars and others, must be put at the disposal of company battery committees and under their control, and are not in any case, to be issued to officers, even on demand.
6. On duty and in the performance of service responsibilities, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but when off duty, in their political, civil and private lives, soldiers shall enjoy fully and completely the same rights as all citizens. In particular standing, at attention and compulsory saluting when off duty are abolished.
7. In the same way, addressing officers by honorary titles is abolished.

DOCUMENT E *An extract from **The Russian Revolution** by Richard Pipes, an American historian, first published in 1990.*

One of the myths of the Russian Revolution is that Order Number One was dictated by a crowd of grubby soldiers. Sukhanov has left a vivid picture of the Social Democrat lawyer N D Sokolov seated at a table in Taurida and writing down the demands of the troops. There even exists a photograph which seems to lend visual credibility to this version of the Order's origin. It was originally formulated [written] not by rank and file soldiers, but by civilians and garrison delegates picked by the Ispolkom [the executive committee of the St Petersburg Soviet], some of them officers and most of them members of Socialist parties. ...The principal clauses of Order Number One were formulated by socialist intellectuals eager to secure a dominant influence over the garrison ... aware that traditionally the principal counter-revolutionary threat came from the armed forces ... they wanted to reduce the authority of the officers over the troops and to keep weapons out of their hands.

1. Explain briefly the following references:
 - (a) '...against the Cossacks and the police' [Document A]. *[2 marks]*
 - (b) 'The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies...' [Document D]. *[2 marks]*

2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Documents C and E. *[5 marks]*

3. Evaluate Documents A, B and D as sources of historical evidence. *[5 marks]*

4. Using these documents and your own knowledge explain in what ways and why the role of the military was important in the 1917 February Revolution. *[6 marks]*

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SECTION B

PRESCRIBED SUBJECT 2: The Origins of the Second World War in Asia 1931 - 1941

These documents refer to the decision made by the United States in 1940 to support countries resisting Japanese aggression.

DOCUMENT A *“Fireside chat” to the people of the United States, Franklin D Roosevelt, December 29, 1940.*

... Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our American civilisation been in such danger as now.

For, on September 27, 1940, by an agreement signed in Berlin, three powerful nations, two in Europe and one in Asia, joined themselves together in the threat that if the United States of America interfered with or blocked the expansion program of these three nations – a program aimed at world control – they would unite in ultimate actions against the United States.

... Does anyone seriously believe that we need to fear attack anywhere in the Americas while a free Britain remains our most powerful naval neighbour in the Atlantic? Does anyone seriously believe, on the other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers were our neighbours there?

If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and the high seas – and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun – a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military. ...

... We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war. ...

DOCUMENT B *Charles A Beard, US Historian, Testimony to Senate Subcommittee, 1941*

Is Congress prepared to pour out American wealth **until the Chongqing government in China has conquered the Najing (Nanking) government?** Until Japan is expelled from the continent? Until Japanese Communists are finally suppressed? And until Soviet Russia is pushed back within the old Russian borders?

And if European or Asiatic powers should propose to make settlements without providing democracy, bill of rights and economic security for everybody, everywhere, will Congress insist that they keep on fighting until the President of the United States is satisfied with the results? If none of the countries deemed [included] under the terms of this bill to be defending the United States succeeds in defeating the enemy with the material aid rendered by the United States, will Congress throw millions of boys after the billions of dollars?

DOCUMENT C *Letter from Sumner Welles (Under-Secretary of State) to Harry Hopkins (Personal Aide to President Roosevelt) July 7, 1941.*

I know that you are keenly interested in seeing that the assistance we are rendering China under authorisation of the **Lease and Lend Act** of March 11, 1941, shall be as prompt and effective as possible. It is also clear that numerous causes over which you can have no control, including imperative [essential] needs in other parts of the world, are constantly operating to obstruct the shipment of supplies to China.

Nevertheless, the situation in the Far East is causing us anxiety, and I venture to suggest that if anything further can be done to increase the speed and the volume of munitions [weapons] and supplies going to China it would appear highly advisable to make additional effort to that end.

The fact is that the German invasion of Russia may very possibly serve to cause Japan to take some further aggressive action. Among the obvious possibilities are: (1) invasion of Siberia; (2) expansion to the southward; and (3) intensification of Japanese military operations in China.

DOCUMENT D *Roosevelt's order to Harry Hopkins to expedite material to China, October 24, 1941.*

H.H. Speed up!

FdR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

To enable China to contribute its part in the common struggle against Japan and Germany as outlined to you, China needs immediate delivery of part of the modest allotment of airplanes and ordnance already made to it.

A AIRCRAFT

Pursuit Planes

Bombers

General Kai-shek's request	360	150
Delivered	100 P-40s	0
Present allocation	269	66
Promised '41 shipments	83	24
Needed immediate diversion	188	126

B ORDNANCE

	37 km	75 km	MS Light	3"	Cal. 50
	<u>Anti-Tank</u>	<u>Howitzers</u>	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>Anti-Aircraft</u>	<u>A.A.</u>
	<u>Guns</u>				

Requested	720	600	120	96	1360
Delivered	0	44	0	0	100
Allocated	240	598	0	0	186
To be shipped '41	60	178	0	0	185
Additional needed immediately	300	300	120	24	750
Power	800 tons needed immediately for small areas now in use.				

C CONCLUSION

If you think it wise, would it be possible for you to ask the Secretary of War for the immediate diversion of the needed aircraft requisite crews, and ordnance?

T.V. Soong

T.V. Soong

October 24, 1941

DOCUMENT E *An extract from, Robert Dallek, Franklin D Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1972.*

Yet Roosevelt still had no intention of closing off all oil to Japan. While he wanted a comprehensive order that would allow him to do so at anytime, he had no inclination to do it at once. The President, Ickes complained, “was still unwilling to draw the noose tight. He thought that it might be better to slip the noose around Japan’s neck and give it a jerk now and then. ... The effect of the freezing order is to require an export license before any goods can be shipped to Japan but the President indicated that we would still continue to ship oil and gasoline.” As Roosevelt explained it to a group of civilian defence volunteers on July 24, oil exports to Japan served American and British self-interest by keeping the Japanese out of the Dutch East Indies and thereby preventing a war in the South Pacific which would disrupt essential lines of supply. Roosevelt also tried to forestall a crisis with Japan by proposing that if Tokyo withdrew from Indochina, the powers would neutralise the area and guarantee equal access to all its resources. Though Roosevelt had little hope of a favourable response to his plan, he saw it as “one more effort to avoid Japanese expansion to [the] South Pacific.”

5. Explain briefly the following references:

- (a) ‘... the Lease and Lend Act’ [Document C]. [1 mark]
- (b) ‘... until the Chongqing government in China has conquered the Nanking government’ [Document B]. [1 mark]
- (c) ‘... If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and the high seas’ [Document A]. [2 marks]

6. According to the documents how consistent was Franklin D Roosevelt in his attitude towards the Axis Powers in 1940 and 1941? [5 marks]

7. How reliable are documents A and E as historical evidence? [5 marks]

8. Using evidence from the documents and your own knowledge explain why United States’ foreign policy towards Japan changed between 1939 and 1941. [6 marks]

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SECTION C

PRESCRIBED SUBJECT 3: The Cold War 1945 - 1964

These documents refer to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.

DOCUMENT A *An extract from **We now know: Rethinking Cold War History** by John Lewis Gaddis, published in 1997. Gaddis is Professor of History at Yale University.*

“As it happened, though, Korea (the Korean War) turned out to be the most bitterly contested of all Cold War battlegrounds. The reasons why are controversial even today ... its origins had been shrouded in an unusually bewildering array of officially sponsored myths ... The best place to start is with the fact that in Korea the superpowers had superimposed their rivalry upon a civil war that would have existed in any event.”

DOCUMENT B *June 27, 1950. Statement by the President of the United States (Harry S Truman) to the press. **Memoirs of Harry S Truman 1946-1952 Years of Trial and Hope.***

“In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. ...This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government Troops cover and support. ...The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that **Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion** to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. ... In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in the area.

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack upon Formosa. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States Forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States of Indochina and the dispatch of military force to provide working relations with those forces.”

DOCUMENT C *Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev Remembers, edited and translated by Strobe Talbott, published in 1970.*

“I must stress, that the war wasn’t Stalin’s idea, but Kim Il-Sung’s. Kim was the initiator.”

DOCUMENT D *An extract from America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1996 by Walter LaFeber (Professor of History at Cornell University), published in 1997.*

... since 1946 Kim had been closely tied to Mao’s Chinese Communists, indeed too closely for a Korean who was a nationalist as well as a communist. He had gained a measure of independence by moving closer to the Soviet military in 1949. In early 1950 Kim travelled to Moscow several times to ask Stalin for help in conquering the South. The Russian dictator finally gave the green light and promises of supplies, but he made clear that neither Soviet forces nor prestige would be involved. If Kim’s grand plans collapsed, the cautious Stalin was going to be standing clear of the debris. If Kim succeeded, however, he would break free of Mao and unite Korea.

DOCUMENT E *Working Paper No 8, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Centre (Washington, DC), in Soviet aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War by Kathryn Weathersby, published in 1993.*

The North Korean attempt to reunify the country through a military campaign clearly represented a sharp departure from the basic Soviet policy toward Korea. The initiative for this departure came from Pyongyang, not Moscow. In the Spring of 1950 Stalin approved Kim’s reunification plan and provided the necessary military support, but only after repeated appeals from Kim and only after having been persuaded that the United States would not intervene in the conflict. Conclusive evidence of Stalin’s reasons for finally supporting the North Korean reunification plan has not been released, but it appears that Stalin’s motive may well have been to tie the Chinese Communists more firmly to the USSR, to prevent rapprochement between the PRC and the United States. ... it was Soviet weakness that drove Stalin to support the attack on South Korea, not unrestrained (Russian) expansionism imagined by the authors of NSC-68.

9. Explain briefly the following references:
- (a) '... a civil war' [Document A]. *[2 marks]*
 - (b) '... NSC-68' [Document E]. *[2 marks]*
10. In what ways do Truman's view of communist aims as expressed in Document B, differ from those stated by the authors of Documents C and D? *[5 marks]*
11. Analyse the reliability of Documents B and C. *[5 marks]*
12. Using these documents and your own knowledge, discuss the effects of the Korean War on the Cold War. *[6 marks]*
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